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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
L. C. SKELTON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
FRANK E. LEES, as Director of Department of Registration of the State
of Utah; J. LaRUE OGDEN, JERALD CHRISTIANSEN, RAYMO·ND
J. CORFIELD, DANIEL M.
SCHWARTZ, GLEN L. ENKE,
WAYNE SHAW, and E. W. ENGELMANN, as Members of the Representative Committee of Professional
Engineers and Land Surveyors,

Case No.
8752

Defendants a.nd Appellants.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In respondent's brief it is claimed that Chapte·r 118,
Laws of Utah 1955 (Chapter 22, Title 58, U. C. A. 1953,
as amended) , is unconstitutional. In our initial brief we
did not consider the question of constitutionality and therefore it is deemed vital that respondent's arguments be met.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
CHAPTER 118, LAWS OF UTAH 1955 (CHAPTER 22, TITLE 58, U. C. A. 1953, AS AMENDED) IS CONSTITUTIONAL.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
CHAPTER 118, LAWS OF UTAH 1955 (CHAPTER 22, TITLE 58, U. C. A. 1953, AS AMENDED) IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
The respondent's brief challenges the constitutionality
of Chapter 118, Laws of Utah 1955 (Chapter 22, Title 58,
U. C. A. 1953, as amended), as unlawfully delegating authority to an administrative agency without specifying the limitations within which the agency is to act. As authority
respondent relies upon the 1953 case of Prouty v. Heron
(Colo.), 255 P. 2d 755.
Our consideration of respondent's claim will be as follows:
"In approaching the subject we have in mind
the rule that when an act of the Legislature is attacked on grounds of unconstitutionality the question presented is not whether it is possible to condemn the act, but whether it is possible to uphold
it. The presumption is always in favor of validity,
and legislative enactments must be sustained unless
clearly in violation of fundamental law. * * *
Every presumption will be indulged in favor of leg-
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islation and only clear and demonstrable usurpation
of power will authorize judicial interference with
legislative action. * * *" Lehi City v. Meiling,
87 Utah 237, 48 P. 2d 526.
In Prouty v. Heron, supra, an action was. brought to
enjoin the Colorado State Board of Examiners for Engineers and Land Surveyors from classifying engineers as
to specific branches, the plaintiff challenging the constitutionality of the Colorado legislation which authorized the
Board to restrict engineering licenses. to specific branches
of the engineering field. In holding the act unconstitutional,
the Colorado Supreme Court set out specific wording in
the statute which it deemed objectionable. However, the
same wording, and the problem of unlawful delegation has
been considered in other jurisdictions and the issue resolved
in favor of constitutionality.
In the 1955 case of People v. Babcock, 343 Mich. 671,
73 N. W. 2d 521, a Michigan act providing for the registration of professional engineers, architects and land surveyors, stated in part:
"An applicant for examination for registration
* * * must * * * have not less than eight
years of practical experience in architectural or
engineering work * * * or must be a graduate
in architecture or engineering of a college or school
acceptable to the Board, and have had not less than
four years of experience of a nature satisfactory to
the Board." (Emphasis added.)
The Act also provided :
"The Board shall issue a certificate of registration upon payment of registration fees as provided
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for in this act to any applicant who in the opinion of
the Board has satisfactorily met all the requirements
of the act * * * (Emphasis added.)
The statute was challenged on the basis of being vague,
indefinite, an unlawful delegation of legislative authority
to an administrative agency and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution and Article V
of the Constitution of Michigan. The court concluded:
"The object of the act is to safeguard the life,
health and property of the citizens of the state by
providing tests for each applicant and to provide
certificates to those who meet the qualifications provided by the Legislature. The act is constitutional."
In the case of Clayton v. Bennett, 5 Utah 2d 152, 298
P. 2d 531, this court held constitutional legislation which
delegated to the Department of Registration, upon action
and report of the appropriate representative committee, the
following power :
" ( 1) defining * * * what shall constitute a school, college, * * * in good standing.
(2) Establishing a standard of preliminary education
deemed requisite to admission to any school, college
or university. (3) Prescribing the standard of
qualification requisite before license shall issue
* * * (5) Providing for a fair and wholly impartial method of examination * * * "
We submit that the delegation considered in the Clayton
decision was as broad, if not broader, in scope than the
delegation under consideration in the case at bar. In the
Clayton case, this court stated:
"In regard to the second matter complained of,
the alleged failure of the legislature to prescribe

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
definite standards, it is to be noted that certain
basic qualifications relating to education, age, moral
character and the requirement of satisfactorily passing an examination are set forth in the statutes. It
seems obvious that the legislature could go no further than to set up such general standards." * * *
In Douglas v. Noble, 261 U. S. 165, the Supreme Court
of the United States held:
"The statute provides that the examination shall
be before a board of practicing dentists; that the
applicant must be a graduate of a reputable dental
school; and that he must be of good moral character.
Thus, the general standard of fitness and the character and scope of the examination are clearly indicated. Whether the applicant possesses the qualifications inherent in that standard is a question of
fact. * * * The decision of that fact involves
ordinarily the determination of two subsidiary questions of fact. The first, what the knowledge and
skill are which fit one to practice the profession.
The second, whether the applicant possesses that
knowledge and skill. The latter finding is necessarily an individual one. The former is ordinarily one
of general application. Hence, it can be embodied
in rules. The legislature itself may make this finding of the facts of general application, and, by embodying it in the statute, make it law. When it does
so, the function of the examining board is limited to
determining whether the applicant complies with the
requirements so declared. But the legislature need
not make this general finding. To determine the
subjects of which one must have knowledge in order
to be fit to practice dentistry; the extent of knowledge in each subject; the degree of skill requisite;
and the procedure to be followed in conducting the
examination ;-these are matters appropriately com-
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mitted to an administrative board. * * * And
a legislature may, consistently with the Federal
Constitution, delegate to such board the function of
determining these things, as well as the function
of determining whether the applicant complies with
the detailed standard of fitness." * * *
The foregoing was quoted with approval and was support
for the decision of this court in Clayton v. Bennett, supra.
See also Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U. S. 425.

Garman v. Myers (Okla.), 80 P. 2d, concerned itself
with two of the problems before this court. In addition to
setting forth a definition of "arbitrary" similar to that
advocated in our initial brief, the court considered statutory
language similar to that which is objected to by the respondent. That case held in part:
"Plaintiff here contends that to hold the Board
has unlimited power to determine what constitutes
engineering experience which is to say the Legislature provided no rule or standard to test the qualifications, in effect leaving the entire matter to an
arbitrary declaration of the Board.
"Such is not our understanding of either the
Act or the power vested in the Board. Plaintiff
argues in this respect that the provision of the Act
stating 'of a character satisfactory to the Board,'
does not permit an exercise of discretion by the
Board, so long as the experience claimed falls within
the definitions of professional engineering as set
forth in Section 2 of the Act, saying the delegation
of an arbitrary power 'vould clearly be unconstitutional.
"We find no merit in this argument. The legislature created this Board, defined the phases of en-
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gineering to be considered, and empowered this
Board to pass upon applicants, to determine whether
they were properly qualified under the terms of the
Act itself. No arbitrary power was vested in the
Board, the only power vested in the Board being the
power to examine applicants under the standards set
forth in the Act. The Board did not prescribe what
constituted engineering experience, but only, after
hearing plaintiff's application, determined by applying the standard set up in the Act itself, that
certain experience claimed by plaintiff was not the
type of engineering service requiring the application of engineering principles." (Emphasis added.)
See State v. Spears (N. M.), 259 P. 2d 356; Hatfield v. N.
M. State Board of Reg. (N. M.), 290 P. 2d 1077.
In Mutual Film Corporation v. Ohio Industrial Commission, 236 U. S. 230, a statute empowered a State Board
of Censors to permit exhibition of "only such films as are
in the judgment and discretion of censors of a moral, educational or amusing and harmless character." This statute
was upheld as against an attack of unlawful delegation.
In Ex Parte Whitley, 77 P. 879, a statute granted
power to a Board of Dental Examiners to determine what
constitutes "a reputable dental college." The statute was
upheld as against a challenge of unlawful delegation.
In Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183, an ordinance
provided for the granting of a license to sell cigarettes:

"*

* * if the mayor shall be satisfied that

the [applicants] are of good character and reputation * * * "
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The ordinance was upheld.
In People v. Witte (Ill.), 146 N. E. 178, a statute provided that undergraduate studies for candidates to practice
medicine shall be such "as shall be satisfactory to the Department." The court held that such phraseology did not
constitute an. unlawful delegation. See also State v.
Lawrence (N. C.), 197 S. E. 586; State v. City of Billings
(Mont.), 255 P. 11.
According to 33 Am. J ur ., Licenses, Sec. 60, page 378-9:

"* * * It is generaYy held that licensing
boards may be invested with discretion in respect of
the personal fitness or character of applicants or
mere matters of detail."
In the annotation, Vesting discretion in public officials, 92
A. L. R. 400 at 410, the text states:
"It has been held that it is not always necessary
that statutes and ordinances prescribe a special rule
of action, but, on the other hand, some situations
require the vesting of some discretion in public officials, as, for instance, where it is difficult or impracticable to lay down a definite comprehensive
rule, or the discretion relates to the administration
of a police regulation and is necessary to protect the
public morals, health, safety and general welfare.
It may be noted that the modern tendency is to be
more liberal in permitting grants of discretion to
administrative bodies or officers in order to facilitate the administration of laws as the complexity of
economic and governmental conditions increases."
It is an accepted rule that statutes granting in general
terms to public officials the discretionary right to grant
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or refuse licenses have been upheld where the discretion
involved personal fitness of the applicants. The theory behind this principle is that if a statute is susceptible of two
constructions, the construction sustaining its validity must
be given, and therefore the statute giving discretionary
power will be construed as giving reasonable discretion,
rather than the right arbitrarily to discriminate between
applicants. See annotation, Vesting discretion in public
officials, 12 A. L. R. 1435 at 1450; 54 A. L. R. 1104 at 1112,
and 92 A. L. R. 400 at 415.
Thus far we have considered respondent's objection to
language of Chapter 118, Laws of Utah 1955 (Chapter 22,
Title 58, U. C. A. 1953 as amended) other than the wording
found in the grandfather clause of the act. Directing our
analysis specifically to the latter provision, we submit that
the phrase therein, "mechanical, electrical, or civil engineering" lends itself to such certainty that further definition is impractical and unnecessary. We base our conviction
upon a consideration of the history and purpose of this
grandfather clause, and the use of the terminology in the
experience of men.
Under Section 58-10-2, U. C. A. 1953, the engineer
licensing act so defined engineering as to include only those
applying "civil, electrical, or mechanical engineering principles and data." The Department of Business Regulation
so applied the law in its execution, and received re-affirmance in this application through a legal opinion of the Attorney General in 1953, which opinion in substance concluded that the Act applied to only civil, mechanical and
electrical engineers.
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The 1955 legislation in question can only be interpreted
in its historical setting, for according to State v. Streeter
(Minn.), 33 N. W. 2d 56:

"* * * The purpose of an exception or
grandfather clause is to exempt from the statutory
regulation imposed for the first time on a trade or
profession those members thereof who are then
engaged in the newly regulated field on the theory
that they who have acceptably followed such profession or trade for a period of years, or who are
engaged therein on a certain date, may be presumed
to have the qualifications which subsequent entrants
to the field must demonstrate by examination."
* * * (Emphasis added.)
See also Annotation, Construction of Grandfather clause,
4 A. L. R. 2d 667.
Had Chapter 22, Title 58, U. C. A. 1953 as amended,
been couched in phraseology so as to limit grandfather
rights to practitioners "other than those subject to Chapter
10, Title 58, U. C. A. 1953," we submit there would be no
question as to proper delegation. The present phraseology
does nothing more than make the same limitation. The respondent being subject to the provisions of Chapter 10, Title
58, U. C. A. 1953, the grandfather exemption in the 1955 law
would have no application to him, for its savings features
extend to those who are being regulated for the first time.
In the Prouty case, the Colorado court found vagueness
or uncertainty where a statute provided for licensing of
engineers by "branches". No such problem exists here. The
Utah statute is not concerned with distinctions between,
or similarities of, the various branches of engineering, but
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rather with the extension of grandfather privileges 'to the
newly regulated.
The controlling rule of statutory construction is that
legislative intent should be ascertained and given effect.
We submit that the general purpose behind grandfather
provisions, and the peculiar history of the engineer licensing laws in Utah, establish sufficient guides and standards
in this case for administrative action.
All of this, of course, is not to abandon the argument
that the phrase, "mechanical, electrical, and civil engineering" reduces itself to definition common to the sense and
experience of men, and that further explanation is in this
instance impractical and unnecessary. It is deemed noteworthy in this connection that the curricula of the colleges
of engineering in this state, as well as others, offer courses
in civil, mechanical and electrical engineering; that degrees
are awarded in these branches, as distinguished from other
engineering classifications; that engineers refer to specializations in the branches enumerated.
In Howarth v. Gilman (Pa~), 73 A. 2d 655, a Pennsylvania statute defined practice of engineering as "the practice of civil engineering, mechanical engineering, electrical
engineering * * * " The court rejected arguments attacking the definition for want of certainty, holding that
an act will not be declared inoperative if common sense
and reason can devise and provide the means necessary for
its execution. Respondent's argument, if applied to the
Pennsylvania case would in fact require further definition
of the definition.
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:"Civil engineering", "mechanical engineering" and
"electrical engineering" are all defined in Webster's New
International Dictionary with sufficient precision to be
applicable to interpretation of the Utah statute in question.
In Hatfield v. New Mexico Stat,e Board of Registration
(N. M.), 290 P. 2d 1077, a state board had power to revoke
a certificate of registration if the registrant was found
guilty of "gross negligence, incompetency or misconduct
* * *" No definition of these terms was set forth in the
act. Against a challenge of unlawful delegation the court
held the statute constitutional.
In Mutual Film Corporation v. Ohio Industrial Commission, 236 U. S. 230, the court stated:
"The objection to the statute is that it furnishes
no standard of what is educational, moral, amusing
or harmless, and hence leaves decision to arbitrary
judgment, whim and caprice; or, aside from those
extremes, leaving it to the different views which
might be entertained of the effect of the pictures,
permitting the 'personal equation' to enter, resulting
'in unjust discrimination against some propagandist
film,' while others might be approved without question. But the statute by its provisions guards against
such variant judgments, and its terms, like other
general terms, get precision from the sense and experience of men and become certain and useful guides
in reasoning and conduct. The exact specification of
the instances of their application would be as impossible as the attempt would be futile. Upon such
sense and experience, therefore, the law properly
relies." * * *
In Block v. Chicago (Ill.), 87 N. E. 1011, an ordinance
empowered the Chief of Police to refuse permits for the
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showing of pictures which were "immoral or obscene."' This
statute was upheld as against an attack of unlawful delegation.
We submit that the wordings in question in the foregoing cases are much more susceptible to diverse interpretation and meaning than the phraseology before this court;
yet such wording was not fatal despite the lack of further
definition, all of which points up the inescapable conclusion that ultra strict adherance to any rule which requires
legislative defining of all terms in licensing statutes must
result in a definition of definitions to insure absolute certainty; and on ad infinitum. The public health, safety, and
welfare demand regulation of the professions; such cannot
be sacrificed upon respondent's altar which consists of
nothing more than a play on words.
The ironical thing about respondent's argument on
this point is that the applicant and the Committee talk the
same language and have no misunderstanding as to what
is civil, mechanical or electrical engineering. The applicant
claimed that he applied the principles of civil and mechanical but not electrical engineering (Tr. 56). Exhibit P-4 sets
forth references denoting his engineering experience as
being civil or mechanical. Making his application, respondent did not consider the words "mechanical, electrical or
civil engineering" so vague or ambiguous that any objection was raised ; in fact, he had no difficulty in alleging
experience in those areas and his references indicate a common understanding of those terms.
Heretofore we have set forth the rule that the presumption is always in favor of the legislative validity and enact-
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ments must be sustained unless clearly in violation of fundamental law ... Lehi City v. Meiling, supra.
Furthermore, the act in question contained a savingsclause to the effect that "if any section or sections of this
act· shall be declared unconstitutional or invalid this shall
not invalidate any other sections of this act." (Section 23,
Chapter 118, Laws of Utah 1955.)
"The principles which underlie the application
of the savings clause have been well established. In
the absence of legislative declaration that invalidity
of a portion of a statute shall not affect the remainder, the presumption is that the Legislature intends
the act to be effective as an entirety. The effect of
such a statutory declaration is to create, not the presumption of entirety in effect ordinarily accorded the
statutes, but an opposite presumption of separability." 11 Am. J ur ., Constitutional Law, Sec. 156, page
847, and cases cited therein.
Particularly appropriate in summary is the following
quotation from Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Third
Edition, Sec. 322 :
"The tendency of the more recent cases is to
sustain delegations of the licensing power even when
broad discretions are delegated. This tendency
seems justifiable when activity of licensing is an
appropriate field for legislative regulation and
where the determination of conditions is impracticable for legislative resolution and the legislature has
provided as practical a standard for administrative
guidance as is appropriate for the particular regulation. This~ rule, of course, leaves most cases to be
decided on the particular facts involved but it should
al1oays be 1"ecognized that in the determination of
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quaifications for licenses, the agency who is able to
see and examine the applicant is usually in the best
position to decide; that abuses of discretion may be
held invalid without invalidating the statute; and
that no appreciable divesting of legislative power is
involved in the delegation." (Emphasis added.)

CONCLUSION
In view of the authority and reasoning set forth in
our initial brief and the argument outlined in our reply, we
submit that the decision of the lower court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
RAYMOND W. GEE,
Assistant Attorney General,

Attorneys for App,eUants.
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